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Abstract
We analyse how foreign direct investment (FDI) aﬀ  ects employment security using 
administrative micro data for German employees. FDI intensity is measured at the 
industry level, which enables us to take into account the sum of direct eﬀ  ects at the 
investing ﬁ  rms as well as indirect eﬀ  ects of FDI that stem from competitive eﬀ  ects, 
input-output linkages, technology spillovers, and changes in factor prices. We account 
for both inward and outward FDI, and diﬀ  erentiate these two types of FDI by source and 
destination region, respectively. We also investigate whether speciﬁ  c worker groups are 
aﬀ  ected diﬀ  erently by FDI. We ﬁ  nd that both inward and outward FDI at the industry 
level signiﬁ  cantly reduce employment security. This is particularly the case for inward 
FDI coming from the western part of the European Union, as well as for outward FDI 
going to Central and Eastern Europe. The eﬀ  ects are quantitatively small overall, but 
sizeable for some worker groups such as old and low-skilled workers.
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂows have increased all over the world and the value of Germany’s
FDI outﬂows and inﬂows has more than quadrupled within ten years to reach a volume of more than
US $ 162 billion and US $ 76 billion in 2007, respectively.1 The growing importance of FDI has raised
a controversial debate among both economists and politicians. On the one hand, FDI can enhance
eﬃciency due to increased specialization and induce an international diﬀusion of technology. On the
other hand, politicians and employees in industrialized countries are concerned about the potential
negative eﬀects on wages and job security. One particular concern is that both inward and outward
FDI may lead to increased lay-oﬀs of low-skilled workers, arguably caused by fundamental changes to
the allocation of economic activity.
In the case of outward FDI, these fears are mainly about the relocation of domestic production.
However, despite a growing number of studies, the question whether outward FDI complements or
substitutes for domestic employment still seems to be unresolved as existing empirical studies yield
conﬂicting results.2 The existing literature on the employment eﬀects of FDI consists on the one hand
of industry- and country-level studies (see e.g. Slaughter, 2000) which are able to account for direct
and indirect employment eﬀects of FDI, but are often plagued with econometric problems such as
aggregation bias and endogeneity. On the other hand, there are micro studies that either use ﬁrm-
level data (see e.g. Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2009) or linked-employer employee data (see Becker and
Muendler, 2008, for instance). These studies have the advantage of accurately measuring direct eﬀects
of FDI, but cannot account for indirect eﬀects on other workers that stem from competitive eﬀects,
spillovers, factor price changes, and input-output linkages. For example, a ﬁrm investing abroad may
be induced to replace domestic suppliers by foreign suppliers, or it may gain market shares at the
expense of local competitors. Clearly, these indirect eﬀects do equally matter for the employment
prospects of domestic workers.
Likewise, in the case of inward FDI, an analysis of the direct eﬀect of a foreign acquisition on
employment outcomes in the acquired domestic ﬁrm will not determine the total eﬀect of the in-
vestment. For instance, Girma and G¨ org (2007) argue that the wage increases which are frequently
observed in acquired plants after foreign acquisitions do not allow them to draw welfare conclusions
because higher wages might harm competitors if these higher wages are used to poach workers from
other ﬁrms or if competitors are priced out of the market. Similarly, competitive pressures on product
markets induced by foreign ﬁrm entry can lead to a crowding-out of incumbent ﬁrms (e.g. Kosova,
2010). In contrast, productivity spillovers induced by FDI, which have been the object of study in a
1Cf. http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=88.
2See the next section for details.
4large empirical literature (see e.g. Javorcik, 2004), may – if they exist – positively aﬀect employment
security and wages of workers in other ﬁrms.
In this paper, we combine micro data on individual workers’ employment histories with industry-
level data on FDI. Therefore, in contrast to ﬁrm-level studies, we are able to measure both direct and
indirect eﬀects of FDI. On the other hand, and in contrast to pure industry-level studies, we take into
account individual-level heterogeneity. As labour market outcomes of individual workers are unlikely
to inﬂuence industry aggregates, we are thus able to avoid aggregation bias and considerably mitigate
potential problems of endogeneity bias (cf. Geishecker and G¨ org, 2008). The purpose of the paper
is to analyse how individual employment security in Germany is aﬀected by FDI. Studying eﬀects on
employment security is important not only because it aﬀects individuals’ utility, but also because even
temporary non-employment induces search costs and welfare losses due to a non-productive allocation
of production factors. The case of Germany is particularly interesting because, on the one hand,
the German economy is the largest economy in the European Union. On the other hand, Germany
is characterized by highly regulated labour markets and rigid wages. Due to these labour market
characteristics, FDI is likely to aﬀect employment security more than individual wages.
Apart from accounting for direct as well as indirect eﬀects of FDI, we contribute to the literature
in several additional respects. First, we distinguish between diﬀerent types of FDI in an integrated
framework. On the one hand, we analyse the eﬀects of both inward and outward FDI simultaneously.
On the other hand, we distinguish between diﬀerent destination regions of outward FDI and diﬀerent
source regions of inward FDI. As these regions generally display diﬀerent production technologies
and wage levels, FDI going to or coming from these regions follows diﬀerent motives and is therefore
likely to have diﬀerent eﬀects. Second, we perform an in-depth analysis of heterogeneous eﬀects on
workers. In particular, we examine whether workers with diﬀerent skills and of diﬀerent age are
aﬀected diﬀerently by FDI. Finally, we also analyse if the eﬀect of FDI depends on whether it takes
place at the extensive margin (newly founded ﬁrms or production units and newly acquired ﬁrms) or
at the intensive margin (investment or expansion in existing aﬃliates). As recent research suggests,
the margin of investment may matter for the employment outcomes of both inward FDI (Kosova,
2010) and outward FDI (Muendler and Becker, 2010).
To preview our results, we ﬁnd that increases in both inward and outward FDI are on average
associated with a decrease in employment security. Splitting FDI by region, we ﬁnd that the overall
negative association with outward FDI is mainly driven by investments to Central and Eastern Europe,
consistent with theories of vertical FDI. The overall eﬀect of inward FDI can mainly be attributed
to FDI from other Western European countries. Our analysis of heterogeneous eﬀects for diﬀerent
types of workers reveals that individuals with low productivity such as low-skilled, old and very young
5workers are most likely to be negatively aﬀected by FDI. We also ﬁnd that investments at the extensive
margin seem to generate larger eﬀects than investments at the intensive margin.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical
and empirical literature on the eﬀects of FDI on labour market outcomes. Section 3 describes the
diﬀerent data sources employed in the empirical analysis, i.e. the micro data set on individual workers’
employment history, and the ﬁrm-level data set used to calculate FDI intensity by industry and
year. The empirical strategy is laid out in Section 4, Section 5 contains the main results. Section 6
summarizes and concludes the analysis.
2 Related literature
2.1 Theoretical background
The expected labour market eﬀects of inward and outward FDI are closely related to the various types
of FDI and the underlying motives for the investments. While the theoretical models discussed in
this section do not directly deal with the eﬀects of FDI on employment security – in general because
they assume perfect wage ﬂexibility and abstract from any source of labour market imperfections –
their predictions regarding labour demand, wages, and production can be expected to carry through
to employment security once wage rigidity and labour market frictions are taken into account.
Trade theory models that incorporate heterogeneous ﬁrms usually use a combination of transporta-
tion costs and sunk costs to explain why – within industries – some ﬁrms export, others engage in
FDI, and some ﬁrms operate solely on the domestic market (see Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004,
for instance). Within these models, horizontal FDI is conducted to gain access to foreign markets via
greenﬁeld investments (new ﬁrms or production units founded by foreign investors). Thus, from the
perspective of the host country, inward FDI of the horizontal type adds new production facilities to
the economy. Furthermore, since ﬁrms that engage in FDI have a productivity advantage, technology
spillovers to ﬁrms in the host country can be expected. However, job creation in new plants can be
accompanied by reduced innovation incentives for technological laggards (Aghion, Blundell, Griﬃth,
Howitt, and Prantl, 2009), rising wages, or a crowding out of domestic production (Kosova, 2010)
that may also lead to a reduction in labour demand and job security in the host country. From the
perspective of the home country, horizontal outward FDI might substitute for exports and thus reduce
domestic production according to this trade-theoretical model framework.
However, horizontal outward FDI might also positively aﬀect domestic employment, at least for
certain worker groups. The knowledge capital model (Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001) explains
the existence of multinational enterprises with the availability of ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets which are costly
6to replicate, but can easily be transferred to foreign aﬃliates. This induces ﬁrms to concentrate skill-
intensive services at the headquarter. It is likely that this channel rather beneﬁts highly educated and
productive workers.
Another type of FDI consists of vertical cross-border investments that arise due to diﬀerences in
factor prices across countries (e.g. Helpman, 1984; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Arndt, 1997) and sub-
stitute for upstream production stages. In industrialized countries, vertical outward FDI is expected
to typically aﬀect workers with a low education and productivity whose jobs are relocated to low-
wage countries. It may not only reduce labour demand within the investing ﬁrm, but may also harm
workers in supplying ﬁrms, whose production processes are replaced by those of foreign aﬃliates. This
type of FDI can be interpreted as oﬀshoring within the boundaries of the ﬁrm. While it is likely that
oﬀshoring leads to reduced labour demand for some groups of workers, the eﬀect might be oﬀset by a
productivity increase that stems from cost savings and beneﬁts workers of some if not all skill groups
(Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). While most researchers assume that horizontal investments
are the prevalent mode of FDI, others argue that most FDI is neither purely horizontal nor purely
vertical (Helpman, 2006; Alfaro and Charlton, 2009).
Furthermore, there are additional motives for investments that may equally matter for employment
outcomes. For example, cross-border mergers and acquisitions – which take a considerable share
in FDI – may also be motivated by market power (Neary, 2007), by the desire to gain access to
country- or ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007, 2008), or by eﬃciency motives, exploiting
economies of scale and scope (R¨ oller, Stennek, and Verboven, 2001). The expected eﬀects of FDI
through acquisitions depend on whether eﬃciency increases exist and whether they are large enough
to outweigh the reduction in production due to increased market concentration. Because of the various
types of FDI, it is diﬃcult to predict the overall impact of FDI on employment security in the home
as well as in the host country. Hence, the research question ultimately boils down to an empirical
matter.
2.2 Existing empirical work
The existing empirical literature is quite sizable when it comes to labour market eﬀects of outward
FDI.3 Researchers have aimed at measuring the degree of substitutability between foreign and domestic
labour either by estimating the elasticity of domestic labour demand with respect to foreign wages,
or by regressing domestic employment on foreign employment or another measure of foreign aﬃliate
production. So far, results have not been conclusive. Some studies ﬁnd a weak substitutability between
parent and aﬃliate employment (Braconier and Ekholm, 2000; Becker, Ekholm, J¨ ackle, and Muendler,
3See Crin` o (2009) for a recent and comprehensive survey.
72005; Konings and Murphy, 2006), which is mostly driven by activities in other high-wage countries,
while other studies point to a complementary relationship (Brainard and Riker, 1997; Desai, Foley, and
Hines, 2009). Aiming to reconcile these contradicting ﬁndings, Harrison and McMillan (forthcoming)
stress the importance of distinguishing between horizontal and vertical FDI motives. In their study
on the US, they ﬁnd foreign and domestic labour to be substitutes in the case of horizontal FDI
and to be complements in the case of vertical FDI. On the other hand, Muendler and Becker (2010)
highlight diﬀerences between multinationals’ expansions at the extensive and the intensive margin,
with domestic employment predominantly responding to changes at the extensive margin.4
None of the aforementioned studies looks at short-term labour market dynamics. Becker and
Muendler (2008) investigate this issue using linked employer-employee data for German multination-
als.5 Comparing jobs in FDI-expanding ﬁrms to those in non-expanding ﬁrms via matching techniques,
they ﬁnd that FDI expansions abroad lead to lower job separation rates at home. This positive eﬀect
on the worker retention rate is more pronounced for higher educated workers.
Another popular line of research investigates the eﬀects of outward FDI on the skill intensity of
domestic production. Whereas Head and Ries (2002) and Hansson (2005), using ﬁrm-level data for
Japan and Sweden, respectively, ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of oﬀshore production on the relative demand
for skilled labour, Slaughter (2000) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant relationship using industry-level data for the
US.
Regarding inward FDI, the empirical literature has mainly aimed at identifying (potential) spillover
eﬀects on the domestic economy, in particular on productivity.6 Most have done so with limited
success.7 Another related strand of the literature investigates the eﬀects of foreign ownership and
cross-border mergers and acquisitions on the domestic labour market. G¨ org and Strobl (2003) ﬁnd
that foreign-owned ﬁrms are more likely to exit the market, but that jobs generated in these ﬁrms are
more stable. Results on the eﬀects of foreign acquisitions on employment growth in target ﬁrms are
mixed (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Bandick and G¨ org, 2010; Girma and G¨ org, 2004). Pesola (2009)
4In other related work, Stiebale and Trax (forthcoming) ﬁnd positive eﬀects of cross-border M&As on the acquirers’
domestic employment growth rates.
5There are a several studies that analyse the impact of industry-level international outsourcing – measured as the
share of imported intermediates in industry total output – on individual labour market transitions (Egger, Pfaﬀermayr,
and Weber, 2007; Geishecker, 2008; Munch, 2010; Bachmann and Braun, 2011; Baumgarten, 2009). Outsourcing mea-
sures in these studies include intra-ﬁrm imports and imports from external suppliers. These studies yield mixed results
concerning the eﬀects of outsourcing on employment stability.
6One example for a study on a diﬀerent outcome variable, namely wages, is given by Aitken and Harrison (1996).
Analysing data on Mexico, Venezuela, and the US, they ﬁnd positive wage eﬀects for foreign-owned ﬁrms in all three
countries. They ﬁnd some indication for spillovers on other domestic ﬁrms in the US but not in Mexico and Venezuela.
7G¨ org and Strobl (2001) summarize the earlier literature. A recent example is given by Haskel, Pereira, and
Slaughter (2007). Javorcik (2004) in her study on Lithuania ﬁnds larger eﬀects when she considers spillovers not only
in the same industry – as most of the previous literature did – but also in upstream and downstream sectors.
8analyses job separations following foreign acquisitions, being thus more closely related to the research
question addressed in this paper. She ﬁnds some evidence for foreign acquisitions being associated
with higher separation rates in target ﬁrms, although results diﬀer by sector and by time elapsed after
the acquisition.
3 Data and measurement
3.1 Individual-level data
In order to follow individual workers’ employment history over time, we use the Employment Panel
of the German Federal Employment Agency (“Bundesagentur f¨ ur Arbeit”, BA), the BA Employment
Panel, which is provided at a quarterly frequency for the time period 1998–2007.8 The most important
data source of the panel is the employment statistics of the BA. These administrative data cover the
employment history of all individuals in Germany who work in an employment covered by social
security, which corresponds to approximately 75–80% of employment in Germany.9 The basis of the
employment history is the integrated notiﬁcation procedure for health insurance, the statutory pension
scheme, and unemployment insurance.
At the beginning and at the end of any employment spell, employers have to notify the social
security agencies. This information is exact to the day. For spells spanning more than one calendar
year, an annual report for each employee registered within the social insurance system is compulsory,
and provides an update on, for example, the current wage income, the qualiﬁcation, and the current
occupation of the employee. Further worker characteristics included are the year of birth, sex, and
nationality.
The BA Employment Panel is a 1.92% random sample of the quarterly data ﬁles of the employment
statistics. It includes all individuals of the population who are born on seven speciﬁc days of the year.
These days are randomly selected, but remain the same for all waves of the panel. Therefore, the
BA Employment Panel is representative for all dependent-status workers covered by social security
legislation, and panel mortality is not an issue. The panel provides information on workers at a
quarterly frequency, i.e. on 31 March, 30 June, 30 September, and 31 December.
In addition, the panel contains supplementary information on unemployment episodes of the sam-
pled individuals. Thus, for them we can derive three labour market states at the end of each quarter:
employment covered by social security, unemployment if the worker is receiving transfer payments,
participates in active labour market programmes or is registered as job-seeking, and non-participation
8Cf. Koch and Meinken (2004) and Schmucker and Seth (2009) for a description of the data set.
9The most important employment types not covered by the data set are self-employment and public servants
(“Beamte”).
9if there is no record of the individual at the reference date.
Unfortunately, the information on unemployment is not consistent over time. In particular, due
to a change in the notiﬁcation procedures, it is missing for certain municipalities after the year 2005.
Thus, to avoid complications, we subsume the states non-participation and unemployment into one
category and simply distinguish between periods of employment and periods of non-employment in our
analysis. Moreover, we exclude the year 2007 from the analysis in order to avoid potential problems
of measurement error. This is because, due to its timeliness, the last year of the sample is the only
one that has not undergone a posterior revision. One particular problem is that information from the
last quarter of the previous year is simply extrapolated if the new notiﬁcation has not yet reached the
Federal Employment Agency.
3.2 Industry-level data and measurement of FDI
We construct our industry-level FDI indicators making use of the AMADEUS database, which contains
information on ﬁnancial data as well as ownership and subsidiary information for European ﬁrms,
covering more than 1,000,000 German ﬁrms and more than 20,000 (virtually all) foreign subsidiaries.
AMADEUS is provided by Bureau van Dijk and Creditreform – the largest credit rating agency in
Germany. The AMADEUS database has been used in numerous empirical studies on FDI, most of
them measuring productivity and employment eﬀects (see Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004; Budd,
Konings, and Slaughter, 2005, for instance). Ownership information includes the country of origin,
the type of shareholder (private investor, bank, industrial company, etc.) and the percentage of equity
held by each shareholder. We merged a series of yearly updates of the database (spanning the years
2000–2007) to consider entry and exit of ﬁrms and changes in ownership.10
The use of these ﬁrm-level data oﬀers a number of advantages over the use of aggregate statistics
on foreign aﬃliate sales. First, aggregate statistics are not available at the same level of detail. For
instance, there is no information on industry-level inward and outward FDI diﬀerentiated by source
and destination region, which can, however, be obtained from the AMADEUS data. Second, we are
able to focus on those investments that (arguably) follow a strategic economic as opposed to purely
ﬁnancial interest. In particular, we restrict attention to investments which involve majority ownership
and which were undertaken by companies and not by private investors. Third, without longitudinal
10The fact that the aggregate foreign production activities in our sample are close to oﬃcial statistics indicates
that the AMADEUS data are representative for the purpose at hand. Bundesbank (2009) reports that sales of foreign
aﬃliates with a direct German equity share increased from 757 to 910 billion euros between 2005 and 2007, while sales
of foreign subsidiaries in AMADEUS increased from 786 to 948 billion euros during the same time period. Note that
the FDI deﬁnition we use for our empirical analysis diﬀers from the one used in German oﬃcial statistics since we do
not impose a minimum threshold on the value of total assets, but restrict our analysis to majority-owned aﬃliates.
10ﬁrm-level data it would be impossible to determine whether changes in FDI take place at the extensive
or the intensive margin.
To construct industry-level FDI indicators from the AMADEUS database, we proceed as follows.
Following Javorcik (2004) and Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007), we compute the market share








sijt denotes real sales of ﬁrm i in industry j in the year t and Dijt(foreignowner) takes the value of one
if a foreign ﬁrm holds a majority share in ﬁrm i, and zero otherwise. An industry is deﬁned at the two-
digit NACE level. This indicator has several advantages over alternative FDI measures. In contrast
to using the number of foreign-owned ﬁrms, it takes the size of ﬁrms into account. Furthermore,
unlike investment ﬂows it directly measures the (change in) production in foreign-owned ﬁrms and
not ownership changes between diﬀerent foreign investors.
Our indicators for outward FDI are constructed in a similar way. Our measure of outward FDI is







Finally, we use data from the OECD STAN database to construct control variables at the industry
level. These variables include the capital stock, the production value, R&D expenditures, imports,
and exports. For reasons of data coverage (e.g. for R&D expenditures), our analysis is restricted to
the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, the earliest available year for our FDI indicators is 2001 – we
lose information on the year 2000 because we need data for two subsequent years to account for new
entry and changes in ownership, which will be particularly relevant in our extensions concerning the
margin of FDI. This implies that the period of our regression analysis starts in 2002 since we make
use of lagged values of the industry-level variables.
Detailed descriptive statistics of our FDI indicators by industry are given in Table 1. It can be seen
that the ratio of both outward and inward FDI is particularly high in technology intensive industries
like computers and oﬃce machinery, motor vehicles, and electrical machinery, which is in conformity
with most of the previous literature (Greenaway and Kneller, 2007). In line with oﬃcial statistics
there has been an increase in overall inward and outward FDI within the sample period (Bundesbank,
2009). There is, however, considerable variation across industries – some industries have experienced
substantial increases in FDI, while FDI has been declining in other sectors – which we exploit in our
econometric analysis.
11In order to avoid including pure ﬁnancial investments and double-counting across industries in our calculation, we
deviate from the OECD deﬁnition of FDI and only include majority-owned foreign aﬃliates.
11We are able to merge the aggregate industry-level indicators with the individual employment
biographies via the common industry code. Note, however, that in the analysis at hand, no such link
between FDI and individual workers can be established at the ﬁrm level because corresponding ﬁrm
identiﬁers are not available in the BA Employment Panel.
4 Empirical strategy
In order to gauge the eﬀect of the diﬀerent FDI dimensions on employment security, we estimate a set
of hazard models, which allow us to control for state or duration dependence. Given data availability,
our analysis focusses on the manufacturing sector (NACE Rev 1.1. 15–36) and the time period
2002–2006. In a ﬁrst step, we use the BA employment panel data to construct employment spells as
consecutive quarters spent in employment. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne a failure to occur if an individual
is employed at the end of one quarter (that is, at the corresponding quarterly reference date) but
not anymore at the end of the following quarter. Note that by relying on point-in-time information,
we obtain a lower bound for the total number of transitions since we miss those separations that are
reversed within the same quarter.12
We restrict attention to full-time workers aged 18 to 64 in regular employment, thus excluding
apprentices, part-time and marginal employed workers, as well as individuals who are on leave due to
military service, child bearing etc.13
Since we have quarterly data, we choose a discrete (grouped-time) representation of the hazard
model. For this purpose we follow the suggestions of Allison (1982) and Jenkins (1995), and organize
the data in person-period form. The employment hazard λi of individual i is deﬁned as the exit
probability in the time interval [t, t + 1) conditional upon survival up to t:
λi(Xit,α it)=Pr(t ≤ T<t+1 |T ≥ t,Xit,α it), (3)
where T is the random duration variable, Xit a vector of individual, plant, and industry characteristics,
and αit is the baseline hazard. We choose a complementary log-log representation of the hazard rate:
λi(Xit,α it)=1− exp(−exp(β Xit + αit)), (4)
12In addition, the data structure implies a bias towards longer employment spells since the ones starting and ending
between two reference dates are not included. It can be assumed, however, that these very short spells (i) constitute
only a small fraction of all spells among full-time employees in the manufacturing sector, which is the focus of our
analysis, and (ii) are not systematically related to FDI.
13These sample restrictions imply that transitions from full-time to part-time employment at the same establishment
are also coded as failures. We make an exception to this rule when the intervening period spent in part-time employment
only lasts for one quarter. In this case, the ongoing spell is continued. Note, however, that there are only very few of
these transitions such that the eﬀect of this correction on the results is negligible.
12which corresponds to a proportional hazards model of the underlying data process in continuous
time. Note that due to the longitudinal character of our data, some individuals can have multiple
employment spells.
Instead of imposing a particular functional form on the baseline hazard, we model the latter in
a semi-parametric way through a set of interval duration dummies. The chosen intervals are (0;1]
quarter; (1;2] quarters; (2;3] quarters; (3;4] quarters; (4;6] quarters; (6;8] quarters; (8;11] quarters;
(11;15] quarters; and (15;∞) quarters. Hence, full ﬂexibility is ensured at the beginning of each spell,
when many transitions take place.14 In contrast, we are restricted in the way we model the baseline
hazard for long durations – in particular, in our choice for the highest duration category – due to the
nature of our data and our sampling scheme. Since the period of analysis is rather short and we do
not want to restrict ourselves to the analysis of short job spells only, we opt for a stock as opposed
to a ﬂow sampling scheme. However, one aspect we have to deal with is left-truncation or delayed
entry of ongoing spells. That is, in 2002 when our period of analysis starts, many individuals have
already been employed for a while. It is important to condition on the elapsed duration in order to
obtain unbiased results. We are able to do so – albeit in the aforementioned restricted way – by using
the employment information for the years 1998 to 2001, as well. In any case, we consider the implicit
assumption that the baseline hazard is constant for all durations greater than 15 quarters to be a
reasonable approximation.15
The regressor vector Xit includes individual, plant, and industry-level characteristics. At the
individual level, we control for age, tenure, gender, nationality, and the level of education and training.
In particular, we use the information on the level of education and training to deﬁne three skill
groups. Low-skilled workers are individuals with primary or lower secondary education, medium-
skilled workers are individuals with secondary education and/or a completed apprenticeship, and high-
skilled workers are individuals with tertiary education.16 Information about skills and age are also used
to estimate heterogeneous eﬀects for workers with diﬀerent characteristics. At the establishment level,
we control for size, the share of high-skilled workers, and the region of the workplace. At the industry
level, we use the aggregated FDI indicators as described in the data section. We control for several
other time-varying industry characteristics that are expected to aﬀect both FDI and employment
14One reason is that German legislation allows for a probationary period of up to six months during which the
standard rules governing employment protection do not apply.
15Indeed, Kaplan-Meier curves of job durations shown by Boockmann and Steﬀes (2010) have largely ﬂattened out
after 1,500 days.
16To correct for inconsistent and missing information on the individual’s education, we correct the education variable
following an imputation procedure provided by Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and V¨ olter (2006). Speciﬁcally, we use the
imputation procedure 2B proposed by the authors, where education reports are extrapolated if a person’s education
sequence is consistent, i.e. non-decreasing over time.
13dynamics according to economic theory. A measure of (the log of) industry output (logY – measured
as an industry’s production value) is employed to control for changes in demand. The net export
intensity ((EXP − IMP)/Y) controls for other aspects of international competition. The share of
R&D expenditures in industry output (R&D/Y) as well as (the log of) the industry capital stock
(logK) control for (changes in) production technology and the knowledge content of an industries’
output which are likely to aﬀect the demand for heterogeneous skill groups. To reduce concerns about
endogeneity and to allow for a suﬃciently long time span for the eﬀects to materialize, we use lagged
values of all our industry-level variables.17 In addition, the model also contains a full set of industry
and quarterly time dummies in order to capture permanent diﬀerences between industries as well as
general economic conditions and business cycle eﬀects. The presence of industry ﬁxed eﬀects also
ensures that it is indeed the variation of our FDI measures (and the other time-varying industry
variables) within industries over time that drives the regression results, not their diﬀerences in the
cross-section, which could be due to unobservable industry characteristics. Table 2 contains summary
statistics of the variables employed in the empirical analysis.
Two additional caveats with respect to our estimation need to be mentioned. First, ignoring
unobserved individual heterogeneity can lead to biased estimation results of the baseline hazard and
the response of the hazard rate to changes in the exogenous variables (e.g. Lancaster, 1990). While
disentangling true duration dependence from a selection eﬀect is not the aim of the analysis and
hence unproblematic, potential biases in the coeﬃcients of the exogenous variables – which stem from
overestimating state dependence – give more cause for concern. This problem, however, has been
shown to be important in the presence of a wrong functional form of the baseline hazard and much
less so when a ﬂexible speciﬁcation is chosen (cf. for example Meyer, 1990; Dolton and van der Klaauw,
1995). Moreover, theoretical reasonings (e.g. van den Berg, 2001) and simulation results (cf. Baker
and Melino, 2000) indicate that, if present at all, regressors that do not measure state dependence tend
to be biased towards zero so that our estimates should rather be conservative and not exaggerated.
Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we also estimate two alternative hazard models which explicitly
take account of unobserved individual heterogeneity. In the ﬁrst one, we do so by including a normally
distributed random eﬀect, while in the second one, we choose a discrete mass-point distribution for
the individual-speciﬁc ‘frailty’ term (Heckman and Singer, 1984).18,19
17We thereby follow the example of Liu and Treﬂer (2008), who estimate the eﬀect of service in- and outsourcing on
diﬀerent labour market transition probabilities using a sample of US workers.
18The estimation results of both random-eﬀects models turn out to be very similar to the estimation results of the
standard complementary log-log model. They can be obtained from the authors upon request.
19In principle, the presence of repeated spells for some individuals would also allow for a ﬁxed-eﬀects regression
framework. However, the sample period is short so that a large – and most likely not random – share of observations
(from individuals without repeated spells) would be lost. In general, censoring is widespread and not independent of
14Second, as shown by Moulton (1986, 1990), the combination of individual-level and aggregated
industry-level data can potentially lead to (downwardly) biased standard errors due to dependent
errors across individuals. We deal with this issue by clustering the standard errors at the industry-
year level, which corresponds to the level of aggregation of the industry-level variables.20 Moreover,
any contemporaneous residual correlation that is due to time-constant unobserved group heterogeneity
is accounted for by our set of industry dummies. Note that the clustering of the standard errors is
not feasible in the random-eﬀects speciﬁcation, which relies on the assumption of independence of
observations between cross-sectional observations units. We therefore consider the chosen approach
– estimating a standard complementary log-log model but adjusting the standard errors – to be
preferable in our context.
5 Results
In a ﬁrst step, we estimate the model described in the previous section for transitions from em-
ployment to non-employment including aggregate measures of both inward and outward FDI as our
main explanatory variables of interest. In the ﬁrst extension of this baseline speciﬁcation, we anal-
yse whether the source (destination) regions of inward (outward) FDI matter for the labour market
eﬀects of FDI. In further extensions, we also examine heterogeneous eﬀects on workers of diﬀerent
age and skill groups, and interactions between the regional diﬀerentiation of FDI and skill groups.
Finally, we analyse how diﬀerent margins of FDI, namely the extensive and the intensive margin,
aﬀect employment security.
5.1 Baseline results
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the baseline speciﬁcation, displaying the coeﬃcients and
standard errors of the FDI indicators as well as the control variables. The coeﬃcients of the control
variables have the expected signs and can be summarized as follows. First, the likelihood of making
a transition from employment to non-employment decreases with rising employment duration and
job tenure, which may be due to the accumulation of (speciﬁc) human capital, but also reﬂect the
selection of workers into longer-lasting jobs based on unobservables (cf. Kiefer, 1988). Second, there
is a U-shaped relationship between age and the hazard rate, with young (18–25 years) and older
(55–64 years) workers being more at risk than middle-aged workers. This mirrors the hump-shaped
relationship between productivity and age, which has been documented in previous empirical work
(see, for instance, Skirbeek, 2004 for an overview), but is in all likelihood also due to additional
the length of preceding spells, which renders a ﬁxed-eﬀects treatment inappropriate (cf. van den Berg, 2001).
20The signiﬁcance of the results remains unchanged when clustering at the industry level instead.
15factors. For younger workers, less stringent ﬁring restrictions applying to workers who have just
recently started their job probably constitute an important determinant while for older workers,
(early) retirement becomes increasingly relevant. Third, employment security increases in the skill
level. Fourth, women and workers with foreign nationality are more likely to leave employment than
men and German workers, respectively (cf. Royalty, 1998). Fifth, turning to establishment-level
variables, employment security rises with establishment size and the share of high-skilled workers in
the workforce (cf. Bachmann and David, 2010). Interestingly, conditional on our extensive set of
control variables, working in eastern Germany – which still displays much higher unemployment rates
than western Germany – is not associated with a signiﬁcantly higher transition rate from employment
to non-employment.
We now turn to the industry-level variables. It can be seen that net export intensity, output,
and R&D intensity are all correlated with lower transitions to non-employment, i.e. with higher em-
ployment security, although none of these coeﬃcients is statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
By contrast, the industry capital stock is negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated with employment
security, which could be a sign of ﬁrms replacing labour with capital.
The indicators for inward and outward FDI are both signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and both have a
positive sign. This implies that increased intensities of both inward and outward FDI are associated
with an increased hazard of transiting from employment to non-employment. Thus, both types of FDI
seem to have a negative eﬀect on the employment security of workers employed in industries which
experience increased intensities of FDI, compared to workers in industries with lower growth rates of
FDI.
In quantitative terms, a percentage point increase in inward FDI (outward FDI) is associated with
an increase in the hazard rate by 0.7 (0.3) per cent. In order to assess the economic signiﬁcance of
the eﬀects, we also have to take into account the actual variation in our FDI measures. We therefore
compute the implied eﬀects of an FDI increase by one within-industry standard deviation. We prefer
the within-industry over the total standard deviation since in our speciﬁcation with industry dummies,
we rely on within-industry variation across time to identify the parameters. Speciﬁcally, we use the
formula (exp(SD ∗ ˆ βFDI) − 1) ∗ 100%, where SD is the sample average of within-industry standard
deviations of the respective FDI indicator, and ˆ βFDI is the estimated coeﬃcient of the respective
regression. We ﬁnd that the results from our baseline speciﬁcation imply an increase of the hazard
of an individual worker making a transition to non-employment of 1.9 per cent and 1.8 per cent for
inward FDI and outward FDI, respectively.21 Therefore, the baseline eﬀects are quantitatively fairly
21The within-industry standard deviations of inward and outward FDI in the regression sample are 0.027 and 0.060,
respectively (cf. Table 3).
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The results concerning outward FDI are at odds with Becker and Muendler (2008), who ﬁnd posi-
tive eﬀects of FDI expansions abroad on the retention of domestic workers in multinational enterprises.
One of their explanations for this result is that vertical foreign expansions can lead to cost savings,
increased world-wide market shares, and domestic employment growth. Our results imply that the
positive eﬀects of Becker and Muendler (2008) at the ﬁrm level cannot be generalized to the industry
level. One explanation for this may be that large multinational ﬁrms reduce their demand for products
from domestic ﬁrms (in the same industry) as they expand abroad, thus reducing labour demand in
the aﬀected ﬁrms. An alternative and potentially complementary explanation is that multinationals
investing abroad gain market shares at the expense of domestic competitors and force them to exit
the market or to cut production and employment.
The nature of FDI may be very diﬀerent according to its origin (for inward FDI) or its destination
(for outward FDI). It is likely that outward FDI of the vertical type is rather conducted in Eastern
European countries – where wage levels are in general much lower than in Germany – while horizontal
FDI rather takes place in western European countries or the US, although to some degree vertical
linkages may play a role for investment into all countries (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009). There are
various reasons to expect that the eﬀects of inward FDI may vary by region as well. For instance, it can
be assumed that German companies compete most intensely with ﬁrms from other western European
countries and that the eﬀects of inward FDI depend on the degree of technological development of
the source country. We therefore perform an additional regression which includes FDI indicators for
diﬀerent regions. For inward FDI, we distinguish between FDI coming from the western countries of
the European Union (EU), and all other countries. For outward FDI, we diﬀerentiate between the
western countries of the EU, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the US, and all other countries. The
results of this exercise are presented in Table 5.23
For inward FDI, it becomes apparent that while FDI coming from the western part of the EU
is signiﬁcantly correlated with reduced employment security, this is not the case for FDI coming
from other countries. Therefore, it is mainly this type of FDI that is driving the negative aggregate
22The order of magnitude of the estimated eﬀects is similar to the results obtained by Bachmann and Braun (2011),
who use the same data base as we do and focus on the impact of international outsourcing on diﬀerent labour market
transition probabilities. In contrast, Geishecker (2008), using survey data from the German Socio-economic Panel
(SOEP), ﬁnds somewhat larger eﬀects when considering the impact of international outsourcing on employment security.
Yet, recall from our discussion in Section 2 that FDI and international outsourcing as used in the mentioned studies
constitute diﬀerent concepts and are, therefore, only comparable to a limited extent.
23We also investigated whether inward FDI from the US has diﬀerent eﬀects since these ﬁrms often operate at or
close to the technological frontier (Aghion, Blundell, Griﬃth, Howitt, and Prantl, 2009), but we did not ﬁnd evidence
for signiﬁcant eﬀects of FDI from the US.
17employment security eﬀects, although the null hypothesis of a uniform impact across regions of origin
cannot be rejected at conventional levels of signiﬁcance.24 As hypothesized above, an explanation may
be that FDI originating from western Europe reﬂects a similar production technology and thus induces
higher competitive pressures, leading to increased adjustments within the industry. For outward FDI,
the negative employment security eﬀects seem to be caused by FDI going to Central and Eastern
Europe. Outward FDI going to western Europe and the US does not have a statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect. FDI with other countries as destination even seems to have a positive impact on employment
security, although this is only weakly statistically signiﬁcant.25 These results suggest that it is mainly
the cost-saving vertical type of outward FDI which leads to the negative employment security eﬀect.
5.2 Heterogeneous eﬀects of FDI
We now examine how the diﬀerent types of FDI aﬀect diﬀerent worker groups. In order to do so,
we estimate regressions which include the interaction terms of our FDI indicators with worker age
classes, as well as regressions with the interaction of our FDI indicators with workers’ skill levels.
Furthermore, given that we found the eﬀects of FDI to diﬀer strongly between source and destination
regions, we also interact the regionally diﬀerentiated FDI indicators with workers’ skill levels.
The results for workers belonging to diﬀerent age groups are displayed in Table 6. The eﬀects are
similar for inward and outward FDI: negative eﬀects on employment security can only be observed
for young (18–25 years) and older workers (56–64 years), with the eﬀect for older workers being
much stronger than for young workers, especially for inward FDI. Medium-aged workers (36–45 years)
even seem to beneﬁt from inward FDI. These diﬀerences by age are statistically signiﬁcant as the
corresponding Wald tests conﬁrm.
Recalling our discussion of the baseline results above, our results indicate that it is – according to
the age-productivity proﬁle – the most productive group of workers that is unaﬀected or even beneﬁts
from FDI, while less productive workers are negatively aﬀected. Moreover, for young workers, the
aforementioned ﬁring restrictions probably play an important role. If ﬁrms have to adjust their
workforce, it is much more diﬃcult to lay oﬀ workers with long tenure than workers who have recently
started their job. Therefore, if FDI requires labour market adjustments, the burden is likely to fall on
younger workers. For older workers, technology probably plays a more important role. Increased FDI
usually goes together with either technology adoption, changes in work organization, or both.26 Older
24The corresponding Wald test has a value of 0.81, which corresponds to a p-value of 0.37. Note that the Wald
test is preferred over the likelihood ratio test since the latter requires iid observations, and therefore does not allow for
clustering.
25Overall, the Wald test clearly rejects the null hypothesis of a uniform impact across regions of destination.
26See e.g. Fors and Svensson (2002) on the complementarity between international investment and R&D, and
Abramovsky and Griﬃth (2006) on the relationship between oﬀshoring and information technologies.
18workers may not be able to keep up with the resulting work requirements, and are therefore at risk of
losing their job. Labour market policies, such as early retirement schemes, are likely to reinforce this
eﬀect.
The results for diﬀerent skill groups also reveal important heterogeneities although the null hy-
pothesis of a uniform impact can only be rejected for outward FDI. As Table 7 shows, inward FDI
has a negative eﬀect on employment security for low- and medium-skilled workers, which are of a
similar magnitude. For outward FDI, the same two groups are aﬀected, and in this case the eﬀect
for workers with low skills seems to be stronger than for workers with medium skills. High-skilled
workers, by contrast, are not aﬀected by either inward or outward FDI in a statistically signiﬁcant
way. In line with our results for the heterogeneous eﬀects across age groups, it seems that the less
productive workers are those that are most aﬀected, while high-skilled employees – arguably the most
productive workers – do not suﬀer from increased FDI. A possible explanation for the heterogeneous
eﬀects across workers is that highly productive and educated employees are those with the highest
ability to cope with changes in the working environment, increased competition, new knowledge, and
new technologies.
How important are these heterogeneous eﬀects in economic terms? To answer this question,
we again calculate the eﬀect of an increase in the FDI indicators by one within-industry standard
deviation. It turns out that the skill-dependent eﬀects of FDI are still moderate, amounting to 2.1
per cent (inward FDI) and 2.5 per cent (outward FDI) for low-skilled workers, who are most severely
aﬀected. In contrast, the heterogeneities are more pronounced for the diﬀerent age groups. The largest
eﬀect can be observed for older workers. For this worker group, an increase of inward FDI by one
within-industry standard deviation implies an increase in the hazard of transiting to non-employment
by 9.7 per cent.
In a further step, we also analyse whether diﬀerent workers groups are aﬀected diﬀerently according
to the origin of inward FDI and the destination of outward FDI. As becomes apparent in Table 8, the
negative employment security eﬀects of outward FDI going to CEE countries are most pronounced for
low-skilled workers. Medium-skilled workers are also aﬀected, but to a lower degree, and high-skilled
workers are not aﬀected at all. Outward FDI to “the rest of the world” has a positive eﬀect on the
employment security of high-skilled workers, but no eﬀect on other workers. A possible explanation is
that this type of FDI aims to access foreign markets, but does not lead to a reduction of exports and
domestic jobs because of the high distance to the destination countries. Further, these investments can
induce branching (Head and Ries, 2002), where skill-intensive production processes such as product
design are concentrated in the home country and exported to foreign aﬃliates.
As for inward FDI (cf. Table 9), heterogeneous eﬀects for FDI coming from western European
19countries can be observed. In particular, the negative employment eﬀects are concentrated on low-
and medium-skilled workers to a similar degree. Again, however, according to the corresponding Wald
test, the coeﬃcients for the diﬀerent FDI source regions and skill groups are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from each other.
5.3 The extensive and intensive margin of FDI
The interaction between labour market adjustment and FDI may also depend on the margin of FDI.
For example, Muendler and Becker (2010) ﬁnd that when looking at labour demand by multinational
enterprises, domestic employment predominantly responds to outward FDI taking place at the exten-
sive margin. Moreover, with respect to inward FDI, Kosova (2010) ﬁnds that a signiﬁcant crowding-out
of domestic ﬁrms occurs only upon entry (and not anymore in response to subsequent expansions) of
foreign ﬁrms.
In the ﬁnal step of the analysis, we therefore examine whether the extensive and the intensive
margin of FDI have a diﬀerent impact on aggregate employment security. In order to do so, we
calculate indicators for the market entry of foreign investors (the extensive margin of FDI) and for
the expansion of existing production facilities in a foreign country (the intensive margin). For inward
FDI, we deﬁne the extensive margin as the share of sales generated by subsidiaries of foreign ﬁrms
that enter the respective German industry in period t. In contrast, the intensive margin is deﬁned as
the share of sales generated by existing aﬃliates (incumbents) of foreign ﬁrms in period t:
IFDI extjt =











IFDI ext and IFDI int denote inward FDI at the extensive and intensive margin, respectively, sijt
denotes real sales of ﬁrm i in industry j in period t and Dijt(X) takes the value of one if condition
X holds for ﬁrm i at time t, and zero otherwise.
In an analogous way to the indicators for inward FDI, we calculate indicators for outward FDI
at the extensive and the intensive margin. The extensive margin is deﬁned as the ratio of foreign
production by newly founded or acquired subsidiaries of domestic ﬁrms to overall domestic production
in the industry in period t. Analogously, the intensive margin relates foreign production of existing
foreign aﬃliates to domestic production in the industry in period t:
OFDI extjt =
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20These indicators are used in the same way as above, i.e. we include them in a regression explaining
employment security of individual workers. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 10.
For inward FDI, it becomes apparent that it is the extensive margin that plays a crucial role for
employment security of individual workers in Germany. By contrast, there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of
FDI at the intensive margin on employment security. Therefore, employment security of individual
workers in Germany is only negatively aﬀected by the market entry of foreign ﬁrms. If a foreign
ﬁrm expands existing production facilities, there seems to be no signiﬁcant eﬀect. In line with the
results obtained by Kosova (2010), this may be due to market entry by a foreign ﬁrm inducing the
largest change in competitive pressure for incumbent ﬁrms within the same industry. Alternatively,
in the case of foreign takeovers, it could also be due to the new foreign owners cutting down costs
and employment of the acquired ﬁrm in the short run. Indeed, in her study on Finland, Pesola (2009)
ﬁnds some evidence for a foreign acquisition – at least in the industrial sector – being associated with
a higher worker separation hazard only in the ﬁrst year after the acquisition and not in later years.
As for outward FDI, both the indicator for the extensive margin and the indicator for the intensive
margin are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis
of homogeneous eﬀects of the extensive and intensive margins of FDI.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse how foreign direct investment (FDI) aﬀects employment security. Using
administrative micro data for German employees allows us to follow individual workers over time.
FDI intensity is measured at the industry level, which enables us to take into account direct as well
as indirect eﬀects of FDI that may stem from competitive pressure, input-out linkages, technology
spillovers, and changes in factor prices. Furthermore, we distinguish between diﬀerent types of FDI.
On the one hand, we analyse the eﬀects of inward and outward FDI simultaneously. On the other hand,
we examine FDI coming from and going to low and high wage countries. Moreover, we distinguish
between FDI taking place at the extensive and the intensive margin, respectively. We also perform
an in-depth analysis of heterogeneous eﬀects on workers. In particular, we examine whether workers
with diﬀerent skills and of diﬀerent age are aﬀected diﬀerently by FDI.
Our results show that both inward and outward FDI are associated with reductions in employment
security which are, however, small overall. We furthermore show important heterogeneity in the eﬀects
of FDI on workers’ employment security. Very young and old workers are negatively aﬀected by both
inward and outward FDI, while medium-aged workers may even beneﬁt from inward FDI in terms of
employment security. We put these results down to the institutional features of the labour market, as
well as to workers’ ability to adapt to changing work requirements. We also ﬁnd heterogeneity between
21diﬀerent skill groups. Only low and medium-skilled workers seem to suﬀer from FDI, while high-skilled
workers do not seem to be negatively aﬀected. In terms of economic signiﬁcance, the negative eﬀects
are largest for older and low-skilled workers. Thus, overall these results indicate that it is the, arguably,
less productive workers that face greater displacement risks in response to increasing FDI, while the
most productive workers are unaﬀected or even beneﬁt from greater employment security.
One important implication of our ﬁndings is that the results in the literature which are based
on ﬁrm data or linked employer-employee data cannot be generalized to the economy as a whole.
Our approach shows that taking into account indirect eﬀects at the industry level – which may stem
from competitive pressure, input-output linkages and changes in factor prices – leads to very diﬀerent
conclusions. A more detailed analysis of these indirect eﬀects therefore seems to be a fruitful avenue
for future research.
Our results imply that increasing ﬂows of both inward and outward FDI generate adjustment
costs due to lay-oﬀs which lead to a temporary unproductive use of production factors and probably
to increased search costs afterwards. Presumably, our results can to some extent be explained by
characteristics of the German labour market which is characterized by collective agreements and
a low ﬂexibility of wages. However, it should also be stressed that our study is concerned with one
important aspect of the eﬀects of FDI on the labour market, short-run adjustment costs, only. Another
important aspect, which we did not investigate in our paper, consists in the eﬀects on the level of
employment, which are likely to be more long-run in nature. From an economic policy point of view,
there are obviously various beneﬁts from FDI. However, as our results indicate that the workers most
negatively aﬀected from FDI are those with low education and productivity, FDI ﬂows should be
accompanied by measures that aim to increase the productivity of old, very young, and low-skilled
employees.
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Table 1: Indicators of inward and outward FDI by Sector
IFDI OFDI
Change Change
Nace 2 Mean Std. Dev. 2001-2005 Mean Std. Dev. 2001-2005
Foods and tobacco products, beverages 15&16 0.0485 0.0046 0.0055 0.0079 0.0025 0.0040
Textiles 17 0.0748 0.0079 -0.0164 0.0065 0.0009 -0.0013
Wearing apparel, dressing, fur dying, 18&19 0.0444 0.0137 0.0215 0.0194 0.0069 0.0182
leather, leather products, footwear
Wood, products of wood and cork 20 0.0493 0.0094 -0.0150 0.0049 0.0018 -0.0010
Paper, paper products 21 0.1269 0.0092 -0.0204 0.0143 0.0043 -0.0001
Printing, publishing 22 0.0512 0.0297 0.0777 0.0017 0.0008 0.0008
Coke, reﬁned petroleum, nuclear fuel, 23&24 0.1667 0.0180 0.0054 0.0395 0.0175 0.0388
chemicals, chemical products
Rubber, Plastics Products 25 0.1132 0.0316 0.0513 0.0225 0.0041 0.0057
Other non-metallic mineral products 26 0.1532 0.0318 -0.0098 0.0320 0.0089 0.0039
Basic metals 27 0.1554 0.0158 -0.0244 0.0867 0.0298 0.0833
Fabricated metals products 28 0.0795 0.0224 0.0162 0.0297 0.0120 0.0171
Machinery and equipment nec 29 0.1240 0.0091 0.0149 0.0596 0.0125 0.0233
Oﬃce, accounting, comp. machinery 30 0.3673 0.1243 -0.2566 0.1539 0.0683 -0.1542
Electrical machinery and apparatus nec 31 0.2214 0.0518 -0.0923 0.1287 0.0604 0.1305
Radio, TV, communication equipment 32 0.1577 0.0584 0.0406 0.2738 0.3707 -0.5606
Medical precision, optical instruments 33 0.0620 0.0063 0.0061 0.0186 0.0062 0.0145
Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers 34 0.2572 0.0440 0.1213 0.0721 0.0119 0.0316
Other transport equipment 35 0.2289 0.0645 0.0843 0.0399 0.0188 0.0374
Manufacturing nec 36 0.0431 0.0052 0.0028 0.0056 0.0016 0.0009
Weighted average 15-36 0.1483 0.0260 0.0241 0.0537 0.0235 0.0142
manufacturing
Data source: AMADEUS data set. Authors’ calculations for the time period 2001-2005.
Note: “Nace” is the “Nomenclature of economic activities, “nec” stands for “not elsewhere classiﬁed”. The average ﬁgures are
computed using the sales shares of every industry in total sales as weights.
28Table 2: Data description and summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Data source
Individual-level variables
Transition hazard from empl. to non-empl. 0.026 0.159 BA Employment Panel
Duration employment spell: (0; 1] quarter Dur. empl. spell: 1 Q 0.020 0.141 BA Employment Panel
Duration employment spell: (1; 2] quarters Dur. empl. spell: 2 Q 0.018 0.133 BA Employment Panel
Duration employment spell: (2; 3] quarters Dur. empl. spell: 3 Q 0.016 0.126 BA Employment Panel
Duration employment spell: (3; 4] quarters Dur. empl. spell: 4 Q 0.015 0.123 BA Employment Panel
Duration employment spell: (4; 6] quarters Dur. empl. spell: 5–6 Q 0.030 0.169 BA Employment Panel
Duration employment spell: (6; 8] quarters Dur. empl. spell: 7–8 Q 0.028 0.166 BA Employment Panel
Duration employment spell: (8; 11] quarters Dur. empl. spell: 9–11 Q 0.040 0.196 BA Employment Panel
Duration employment spell: (11; 15] quarters Dur. empl. spell: 12–15 Q 0.050 0.219 BA Employment Panel
Job tenure: (0; 2] quarters Job tenure: 1–2 Q 0.071 0.257 BA Employment Panel
Job tenure: (2; 8] quarters Job tenure: 3–8 Q 0.158 0.365 BA Employment Panel
Age: 26–35 Age: 26–35 0.241 0.428 BA Employment Panel
Age: 36–45 Age: 36–45 0.350 0.477 BA Employment Panel
Age: 46–55 Age: 46–55 0.252 0.434 BA Employment Panel
Age: 56–64 Age: 56–64 0.079 0.270 BA Employment Panel
Skill: low Skill: low 0.163 0.370 BA Employment Panel
Skill: medium Skill: medium 0.729 0.444 BA Employment Panel
Sex: female Female: yes 0.232 0.422 BA Employment Panel
Nationality: foreign Foreign: yes 0.085 0.279 BA Employment Panel
Establishment-level variables
Region: east Region: east 0.129 0.335 BA Employment Panel
Establishment size: 1–4 Est. size: 1–4 0.025 0.156 BA Employment Panel
Establishment size: 5–9 Est. size: 5–9 0.036 0.186 BA Employment Panel
Establishment size: 10–19 Est. size: 10–19 0.056 0.230 BA Employment Panel
Establishment size: 20–49 Est. size: 20–49 0.104 0.305 BA Employment Panel
Establishment size: 50–99 Est. size: 50–99 0.104 0.305 BA Employment Panel
Establishment size: 100–199 Est. size: 100–199 0.128 0.335 BA Employment Panel
Establishment size: 200–499 Est. size: 200–499 0.185 0.388 BA Employment Panel
Share of high-skilled in workforce Share high-skilled 0.097 0.124 BA Employment Panel
Industry-level variables
Inward FDI IFDI 0.130 0.076 AMADEUS
Inward FDI from western EU countries IFDI EUW 0.102 0.065 AMADEUS
Inward FDI from all other countries IFDI Non-EUW 0.028 0.032 AMADEUS
Inward FDI, intensive margin IFDI int. 0.097 0.062 AMADEUS
Inward FDI, extensive margin IFDI ext. 0.033 0.045 AMADEUS
Outward FDI OFDI 0.051 0.080 AMADEUS
Outward FDI to western EU countries OFDI EUW 0.035 0.066 AMADEUS
Outward FDI to Central and Eastern Europe OFDI CEE 0.011 0.019 AMADEUS
Outward FDI to the US OFDI US 0.002 0.010 AMADEUS
Outward FDI to all other countries OFDI ROW 0.003 0.012 AMADEUS
Outward FDI, intensive margin OFDI int. 0.039 0.071 AMADEUS
Outward FDI, extensive margin OFDI ext. 0.012 0.020 AMADEUS
Next export intensity NEXP/Y 0.143 0.187 OECD STAN
log(Production value) log(Y) 18.216 0.777 OECD STAN
log(Net capital stock) log(K) 17.186 0.682 OECD STAN
R&D intensity R&D/Y 0.024 0.025 OECD STAN
Data: Regression sample, authors’ calculations for the time period 2002–2006.
29Table 3: Within-industry standard deviations of
FDI indicators













Data: Regression sample, authors’ calculations for the
time period 2002–2006.
Note: This table displays the within-industry standard
deviations, which are used to assess the economic signif-
icance of the regression results.
30Table 4: The eﬀect of inward and outward FDI on the transition hazard
from employment to non-employment - full set of results
Coeﬃcient SE
Dur. empl. spell: 1 Q 1.5071
∗∗∗ 0.0370
Dur. empl. spell: 2 Q 1.3262
∗∗∗ 0.0322
Dur. empl. spell: 3 Q 1.1700
∗∗∗ 0.0579
Dur. empl. spell: 4 Q 1.0161
∗∗∗ 0.0319
Dur. empl. spell: 5-6 Q 0.6778
∗∗∗ 0.0262
Dur. empl. spell: 7-8 Q 0.8124
∗∗∗ 0.0287
Dur. empl. spell: 9-11 Q 0.6373
∗∗∗ 0.0221
Dur. empl. spell: 12-15 Q 0.4496
∗∗∗ 0.0210
Job tenure: 1-2 Q 0.6794
∗∗∗ 0.0304


















Region: east 0.0220 0.0183
Est. size: 1–4 0.7353
∗∗∗ 0.0361
Est. size: 5–9 0.6005
∗∗∗ 0.0437
Est. size: 10–19 0.4866
∗∗∗ 0.0322
Est. size: 20–49 0.3625
∗∗∗ 0.0276
Est. size: 50–99 0.2776
∗∗∗ 0.0231
Est. size: 100–199 0.1383
∗∗∗ 0.0205













No. of observations 2,242,036
Data: (Augmented) BA Employment Panel, authors’ calculations for the time period
2002–2006.
Note: *p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the industry-year level. The (complementary log-
log) regression also includes full sets of industry and quarterly time (=wave) dummies.
Baseline categories: Dur. empl. spell: ≥ 15 quarters; Job tenure: > 8 quarters; Age:
18–25; Skill: high; Est. size: > 500 employees.
31Table 5: The eﬀect of inward and outward FDI on the transition
hazard from employment to non-employment for diﬀerent source
and destination regions
Coeﬃcient SE
IFDI EUW 0.4665∗∗ 0.2354
IFDI Non-EUW 0.2304 0.2777
OFDI EUW 0.3179 0.3943
OFDI CEE 2.5299∗∗∗ 0.9504
OFDI US -0.1255 2.5320
OFDI ROW -1.2327∗ 0.6726
Wald test (IFDI indicators equal), χ2 (1) 0.81
p-value 0.317
Wald test (OFDI indicators equal), χ2 (3) 12.02
p-value 0.007
No. of observations 2,242,036
Data: (Augmented) BA Employment Panel, authors’ calculations for the
time period 2002–2006.
Note: *p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the industry-year level. Further ex-
planatory variables included as in Table 4. EUW stands for the western
countries of the European Union, CEE for Central and Eastern Europe,
ROW for all other countries (rest of the world).
32Table 6: The eﬀect of inward and outward FDI on the transition
hazard from employment to non-employment for diﬀerent age
groups
Coeﬃcient SE
IFDI×Age: 18–25 0.8381∗∗∗ 0.2699
IFDI×Age: 26–35 -0.3799 0.3392
IFDI×Age: 36–45 -0.8020∗∗ 0.3397
IFDI×Age: 46–55 0.6296 0.4970
IFDI×Age: 56–64 3.4328∗∗∗ 0.3698
OFDI×Age: 18–25 0.3506∗∗ 0.1403
OFDI×Age: 26–35 0.1774 0.1280
OFDI×Age: 36–45 0.1370 0.1255
OFDI×Age: 46–55 0.1340 0.1485
OFDI×Age: 56–64 0.6855∗∗∗ 0.2564
Wald test (IFDI × age equal), χ2 (4) 91.75
p-value 0.000
Wald test (OFDI × age equal), χ2 (4) 12.55
p-value 0.014
No. of observations 2,242,036
Data: (Augmented) BA Employment Panel, authors’ calculations for
the time period 2002–2006.
Note: *p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the industry-year level. Further
explanatory variables included as in Table 4.
33Table 7: The eﬀect of inward and outward FDI on the transition
hazard from employment to non-employment for diﬀerent skill
groups
Coeﬃcient SE
IFDI × Skill: low 0.7820∗∗∗ 0.2845
IFDI × Skill: medium 0.7474∗∗∗ 0.2862
IFDI × Skill: high 0.3367 0.4244
OFDI × Skill: low 0.4074∗∗∗ 0.1487
OFDI × Skill: medium 0.3240∗∗ 0.1412
OFDI × Skill: high -0.0177 0.1452
Wald test (IFDI × skill equal), χ2 (2) 2.71
p-value 0.259
Wald test (OFDI × skill equal), χ2 (2) 8.32
p-value 0.016
No. of observations 2,242,036
Data: (Augmented) BA Employment Panel, authors’ calculations for
the time period 2002–2006.
Note: *p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the industry-year level. Further
explanatory variables included as in Table 4.
34Table 8: The eﬀect of outward FDI on the transition hazard from employment to non-employment
for diﬀerent source and destination regions, and diﬀerent skill groups
Coeﬃcient SE
IFDI 0.4065∗ 0.2236
OFDI EUW × Skill: low 0.5540 0.5761
OFDI EUW × Skill: medium 0.2281 0.4131
OFDI EUW × Skill: high 0.7582 0.6949
OFDI CEE × Skill: low 3.4732∗∗∗ 0.9933
OFDI CEE × Skill: medium 2.6055∗∗ 1.1504
OFDI CEE × Skill: high 0.6964 2.6965
OFDI US × Skill: low -1.7369 3.5155
OFDI US × Skill: medium 0.7113 2.6314
OFDI US × Skill: high -5.3428 4.3669
OFDI ROW × Skill: low 0.2044 1.0258
OFDI ROW × Skill: medium -1.4734∗ 0.8435
OFDI ROW × Skill: high -3.6658∗∗∗ 1.0080
Wald test (OFDI regional × skill equal), χ2 (11) 60.34
p-value 0.000
No. of observations 2,242,036
Data: (Augmented) BA Employment Panel, authors’ calculations for the time pe-
riod 2002–2006.
Note: *p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the industry-year level. Further explanatory
variables included as in Table 4. EUW stands for the western countries of the
European Union, CEE for Central and Eastern Europe, ROW for all other countries
(rest of the world).
35Table 9: The eﬀect of inward FDI on the transition hazard from employ-
ment to non-employment for diﬀerent source and destination regions,
and diﬀerent skill groups
Coeﬃcient SE
IFDI EUW × Skill: low 0.8967∗∗∗ 0.2778
IFDI EUW × Skill: medium 0.8301∗∗∗ 0.2987
IFDI EUW × Skill: high 0.3720 0.5074
IFDI Non-EUW × Skill: low 0.5146 0.4971
IFDI Non-EUW × Skill: medium 0.4733 0.2993
IFDI Non-EUW × Skill: high -0.1282 0.5138
OFDI 0.3256∗∗ 0.1329
Wald test (IFDI regional × skill equal), χ2 (5) 5.91
p-value 0.315
No. of observations 2,242,036
Data: (Augmented) BA Employment Panel, authors’ calculations for the time
period 2002–2006.
Note: *p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the industry-year level. Further explanatory
variables included as in Table 4.
Table 10: The eﬀect of inward and outward FDI on the transition
hazard from employment to non-employment, extensive and intensive
margin of FDI
Coeﬃcient SE
IFDI ext. 0.7451∗∗∗ 0.1852
IFDI int. -0.1885 0.2964
OFDI ext. 0.6593∗∗ 0.3081
OFDI int. 0.1737∗∗ 0.0827
Wald test (IFDI ext. = IFDI int.), χ2 (1) 20.10
p-value 0.000
Wald test (OFDI ext. = OFDI int.), χ2 (1) 2.18
p-value 0.140
No. of observations 2,242,036
Data: (Augmented) BA Employment Panel, authors’ calculations for the time
period 2002–2006.
Note: *p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the industry-year level. Further explana-
tory variables included as in Table 4. Deﬁnition of the extensive/intensive
margin of IFDI/OFDI (IFDI/OFDI ext./int.) explained in Section 5.3.
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